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Abstract 
Studies on institutional change generally pertain to the agency-structure paradox or the ability 
of institutional entrepreneurs to spearhead change despite constraints. In many complex fields, 
however, change also needs cooperation from numerous dispersed actors. This presents the 
additional paradox of ensuring that these actors engage in collective action when individual 
interests favor lack of cooperation. We draw on complementary insights from institutional and 
regime theories to identify drivers of collective institutional entrepreneurship and develop an 
analytical framework. This is applied to the field of global climate policy to illustrate how 
collective inaction was overcome to realize a global regulatory institution, the Kyoto Protocol. 
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To account for institutional change, most studies focus on institutional entrepreneurship 
(e.g., DiMaggio 1988), where purposeful actors leverage their social and political skills and 
spearhead change (Fligstein 1997; Garud et al. 2002). With only a few ‘key’ entrepreneurs, 
agency or purposeful action is relatively concentrated with a high degree of coordination 
between the actors (Dorado 2005). However, many institutional changes are complex social 
processes involving highly diverse interests and perspectives. This type of institutional 
change, initiated through ‘convening’ (Dorado 2005), requires collective action – joint 
activities by a wide group of actors on the basis of mutual interests (Emery and Trist 1965; 
Marwell and Oliver 1993) – and is beyond the capacity of individual actors or even a few key 
entrepreneurs. Institutional change in such domains requires ‘collective institutional 
entrepreneurship’ (Möllering 2007), a term that we define as the process of overcoming 
collective inaction and achieving sustained collaboration among numerous dispersed actors to 
create new institutions or transform existing ones. 
Collective institutional entrepreneurship involves ‘collaborative leadership’ (Chrislip and 
Larson 1994), a form of leadership enacted not just by guiding actors but also through other 
media such as structures and processes embedded within a collaboration (Huxham and 
Vangen 2000). It also requires ‘institutional work’ or “practices that go well beyond those of 
institutional entrepreneurs” (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006: 215) which include the purposive 
actions of multiple individuals and organizations, entrepreneurial as well as supportive, aimed 
at creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions. Since collective interests do not always 
produce collective action (Heckathorn 1996), it becomes necessary, however, to not only 
bring collective resources to bear on the problem (Westley and Vredenburg 1997) but also to 
provide motivations to individual participants whose interests may lie in not cooperating. In 
other words, these situations present a collective action dilemma (Oliver 1993). Since most 
research endeavors have focused on either institutional change with concentrated agency or on 
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dispersed agency without the need to coordinate, institutional entrepreneurship that depends 
on collaboration among numerous dispersed agents is a gap that needs scholarly attention 
(Dorado 2005). 
Change in collective action domains constitutes a double paradox. Apart from having to 
reconcile the agency-structure paradox or the ability of actors to spearhead change despite 
constraints (Seo and Creed 2002), actors need to resolve a collective action problem in which 
individual interests may work against cooperation and promote collective inaction. Different 
causes underlie collective inaction. First, individuals may want to free-ride on the 
contributions of others (Olson 1965). Second, a start-up problem may occur where action gets 
held up because all actors are waiting for others to take the lead (Marwell and Oliver 1993). 
Third, there may be actor apathy, where actors abstain from engaging in collective action 
because they feel their contribution to the problem is insignificant (Fireman and Gamson 
1979). All these factors make non-participation and inaction rather than cooperation the likely 
outcome (Heckathorn 1996).  
Since explaining cooperation in collective action domains has not been the main focus of 
research in institutional theory, we draw on insights from regime theory (Hasenclever et al. 
1997; Keohane 1984), which provides complementary insights into explaining collective 
institutional entrepreneurship. Regime theory focuses on how actors, generally at the state 
level, overcome the collective action problem and realize collaboration in areas serving their 
common interests despite the absence of a supranational authority.  The use of regime theory 
resonates with the growing recognition of the contributions of many different literatures to the 
‘cross-pollination’ of institutional theory (Lounsbury and Ventresca 2002), particularly from 
structuration (Barley and Tolbert 1997), social movements (Rao et al. 2000), the resource-
based view (Oliver 1997), transaction cost economics (Roberts and Greenwood 1997), and 
technological innovation (Van de Ven and Garud 1993). Using the strengths in one theory to 
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address the weaknesses in another can provide a more nuanced and multi-faceted perspective 
in understanding collective institutional entrepreneurship. 
We combined insights from institutional and regime theories to develop a theoretical 
framework and applied it to climate change, one of the most salient global problems of our 
times. Initiating and promoting new public policy at the global level in an area characterized 
by conflicting interests was a classic collective-action challenge that in 2005 led to the entry-
into-force of a formal ‘global regulatory institution’ (Maguire and Hardy 2006), the Kyoto 
Protocol. We analyzed how and why most nation states have increasingly cooperated in the 
field of global climate policy despite widely divergent interests and viewpoints. Our main 
contribution is to provide and apply a multi-faceted analytical framework to explain the 
creation of new institutions in a complex and controversial context.  
The paper is structured as follows. We first present the challenge of institutional 
entrepreneurship and change requiring collective action. We then draw on institutional and 
regime theories to set up a framework of the drivers of such change. Next, we apply the 
framework to the institutional field of global climate policy. We conclude with implications 
for theory and practice.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
In situations where groups of stakeholders are concerned about a common issue or 
problem such as environmental degradation, the only route to achieving change is by 
developing collaborative solutions (Gray 1989; Hardy and Phillips 1998; Trist 1983) and a 
‘collective logic of action’ (Lincoln et al. 1996).  Despite the ‘real-world’ importance of such 
complex domains, institutional scholars have paid little attention to collective institutional 
entrepreneurship, notwithstanding a few exceptions (e.g., Phillips et al. 2000). Indeed, most 
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studies tend to focus on the agency-structure paradox and the role of individual actors or a few 
key entrepreneurs, rather than on the challenges posed by the collective action paradox.  
 
Institutional Entrepreneurship and Change 
Institutional theory continues to provide useful insights into explaining not only the 
homogeneity and persistence of institutions but also their change and transformation (Dacin et 
al. 2002). Institutions are products of purposive human action (Jepperson 1991), consisting of 
“cultural-cognitive, normative and regulative elements” (Scott 2001: 48) that provide stability 
and meaning to social life. While institutions can be both formal and informal (North 1990) 
and may exist at the micro, field, or societal levels (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006), our focus is 
on formal global regulatory institutions (Maguire and Hardy 2006). In explaining institutional 
change, the role of exogenous events or ‘jolts’, such as economic shocks, in precipitating non-
isomorphic change is widely acknowledged (e.g., Hoffman 1999). However, increasing 
attention is being paid to ‘endogenously’ driven institutional change, where purposeful actors 
overcome the agency-structure paradox (e.g., Greenwood and Suddaby 2006).
Scholars have explained institutional change by drawing on insights from three main 
‘schools’ within institutional theory. Hirsch and Lounsbury (1997) have called for integrating 
insights from the ‘old institutionalism’, with its focus on issues of agency, vested interests, 
power, and informal structures (Selznick 1949), with those from ‘new institutionalism’, 
stressing structural constraints, embeddedness, and isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 
1991). The third school, institutional economics, emphasizes human agency in devising 
institutions “that structure political, economic and social interaction” (North 1990: 97). In 
theorizing about agency, most scholars invoke the role of institutional entrepreneurs (Aldrich 
and Fiol 1994; Garud et al. 2002; Greenwood and Suddaby 2006; Maguire et al. 2004). 
Institutional entrepreneurs exercise social and political skills (Fligstein 1997; Garud et al. 
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2002) to motivate others by providing them with common meaning and identities and 
manipulate existing institutions by co-opting important constituencies (Beckert 1999) in a 
process that has been described as ‘leveraging’ (Dorado 2005).  
Many sector-spanning institutional fields are, however, too complex for these key 
entrepreneurs to spearhead change unilaterally (Huxham and Vangen 2000; Trist 1983) and 
need ‘institutional work’ from a broad spectrum of actors (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006) who 
need to act in unison and share responsibilities (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006). While 
cooperation among disparate groups which leads to change in such cross-organizational fields 
has not received much attention in institutional theory (Dorado 2005), a substantial body of 
‘non-institutional’ organizational literature has addressed how interorganizational 
collaboration between interdependent actors can induce change in such problem domains 
(Gray 1989; Ring and Van de Ven 1994).  
 The primary focus of the literature on collaboration has been on “collaborative 
advantage, in which something is achieved that could not have been achieved without 
collaboration”, rather than on the dilemmas inherent in collaboration (Huxham and Vangen 
2000: 1160). While research in interorganizational collaboration highlights the characteristics 
of key actors in achieving successful collaboration, less attention is paid to the strategies they 
use to overcome collective inaction (Oliver 1993) and induce cooperation among unaware, 
unsure, or skeptical actors in the absence of hierarchy. In short, we know more about the types 
of actors that facilitate collaboration than about their actual activities. 
A particularly significant arena for studying such cooperation is that of international 
relations, where regime theory scholars have grappled with the question of how global 
cooperation can occur in a world system comprised of sovereign nation states without a global 
government to make and enforce rules (Rittberger 1995; Young 1989). While scholars have 
used organizational theory to make valuable cross-cutting forays into international relations in 
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issues such as the escalation of conflicts (Kahn and Zald 1990), the reciprocal insights have 
been far less compelling (Louis and Gray 1992). We argue that regime-theoretic insights have 
significant potential to inform organizational theory, in particular the notion of collective 
institutional change. 
  
Regime Theory and Collective Action 
Since we are drawing on a stream from international relations which is not commonly 
used in organizational theory, we first provide a brief overview of regime theory, its various 
schools of thought, and the parallels it has with institutional theory. 
 
A Synopsis of Regime Theory 
Regime theory explains collective decision making and implementation aiming at the 
management and resolution of international conflicts through the development of regimes 
(Hasenclever et al. 1997; Keohane 1984). Regimes are defined as social institutions consisting 
of agreed on principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programs around 
which actors’ expectations converge in specific issue areas within the world system (Young 
1989).  
The core constructs used in regime analysis are compatible with an institutional approach 
(Scott 2001; Volger 2003). In many ways, regime theory is thus a theory of international 
institutions that have typically been formalized into explicit laws (Volger 2003), similar to 
what Maguire and Hardy (2006) describe as global regulatory institutions. The arena of 
regimes generally involves multi-level governance and is formed around a common issue or 
interest, just like an institutional field that involves a “community of organizations that 
partakes of a common meaning system” (Scott 1995: 56).  
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There is a proliferation of international regimes, not only with regard to the environment 
(Young and Demko 1997) but also to trade and investment (Murphy 1998) and economics and 
finance (Neumayer 2001). With such a wide range of applicability, it is not surprising that 
there is no one overarching version of regime theory but different strands, which can be 
mapped onto different approaches in institutional theory. 
 
Three Schools of Thought 
Based on the assumptions they make about actors and their motivations, the principal 
schools of thought are: interest-based (neo-liberalist), power-based (realist), and knowledge-
based (cognitivist) (Hasenclever et al. 2000). Interest-based theories, like institutional 
economics, regard self-interest as the basis of cooperation among actors. Power-based 
perspectives share with old institutionalism an emphasis on power differentials as 
determinants of regime effectiveness. The cognitivist theories are the most ‘institution-centric’ 
(Wendt and Duvall 1989) and, like neo-institutionalism, focus on institutionally constructed 
belief systems. 
Interest-based theories represent the mainstream approach in analyzing international 
institutions (Hasenclever et al. 2000). Explanations for resolving problems of multiple 
equilibria in game-theoretic terminology involve motivating calculating actors engaged in the 
pursuit of self-interest through the creation of appropriate incentives and norms of reciprocity, 
such as the mutual dismantling of protective tariffs in international trade (Barrett 2003). In 
power-based arguments, powerful actors create hegemonic stability through a unipolar 
concentration of power in a particular issue area (Keohane 1984). A recent example is that of 
the USA using its influence within the international community to induce other countries to 
join the war in Iraq. Finally, the cognitivist school (Wendt and Duvall 1989) explains 
international cooperation on the basis of institutions: collective identities, beliefs, and norms 
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that a community develops over time. Thus, if internationally agreed norms and rules are seen 
to be legitimate and fair, they exert a “compliance pull of their own” (Franck 1990: 49) 
through norms of reciprocity (Keohane 1984). For instance, decolonization was not just about 
the balance of power or economic incentives but also about the change in beliefs about what 
constituted legitimate rule (Jackson 1993). 
In totality, these three schools of thought provide complementary explanations of 
cooperation among actors. Such cooperation comprises several stages. In the first instance, 
cooperation is required to overcome the start-up, free-ride, and apathy problems, and allow 
the emergence of new regimes. Subsequently, cooperation must continue for the sustenance of 
regimes and this involves costs associated with monitoring to prevent defection (Axelrod and 
Keohane 1986). While institutional theorists attribute actors’ ability to induce cooperation 
primarily through the use of social and political skills, regime theorists have identified 
additional mechanisms that induce cooperation at a collective level. These include setting an 
appropriate ‘game’ structure, linking issues, making side payments, building capacity, and 
assessing performance. Through a review and synthesis of these regime-theoretic change 
mechanisms, in conjunction with traditional accounts of institutional entrepreneurship and 
interorganizational collaboration in the organizational literature, we now develop a framework 
for institutional entrepreneurship in collective action domains. 
 
Drivers of Collective Institutional Entrepreneurship 
While collective institutional change can be triggered by external shocks or “jolts” 
(Hoffman 1999; Meyer et al. 1990) such as scientific breakthroughs, natural catastrophes, 
regulatory upheavals, or technological discontinuities that raise actors’ sensitivity towards an 
issue and galvanize actors into cooperating, the focus here is on endogenous drivers or 
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internal factors that explain how numerous dispersed actors overcome the collective action 
paradox to attain and sustain cooperation in complex domains. We discuss them in turn. 
 
 Manipulating Power Configuration 
This means skillfully reconfiguring power in a particular domain to achieve a power 
concentration that reduces the diversity of opinion and spurs collective institutional 
entrepreneurship. While old institutionalists highlighted how power struggles and conflicts of 
interests create change (Hirsch and Lounsbury 1997), neo-institutionalists, especially those 
focusing on non-isomorphic institutional change, also consider power and control of resources 
to be a central aspect of collaboration and change (Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Clegg et al. 
2006). Substantial power differences among participants in ‘volatile domains’ can inhibit the 
formation of collaborative relationships (Hardy and Phillips 1998), although the dominance of 
some over others can also provide the stage for collaboration (Huxham and Vangen 2005). 
Power differences between actors can be used by the more powerful to dictate the rules of the 
game and induce cooperation; in the absence of a powerful ‘storekeeper’ or hegemon, others 
(free-riders) would be unwilling to ‘mind the store’ and regime effectiveness would erode 
(Krasner 1983).  
 
Creating Common Ground 
This represents a repertoire of bridging tactics that socially skilled actors use to induce 
cooperation from both allies and adversaries (Fligstein 1997). These include: ‘framing’ 
(Benford and Snow 2000), which induces cooperation by appealing to mutual identity and 
interests (Ansell 1998); setting an agenda which others believe to be in their own interests 
(Lukes 1974); expressing tangible and task-oriented, rather than elusive goals (Huxham and 
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Vangen 2005); and building ‘cognitive legitimation’ by spreading public knowledge about an 
issue to make it more familiar and amenable to acceptance (Aldrich and Fiol 1994). 
The cognitivist school in regime theory resonates with the institutional argument that 
actors operate in harmony with the consensual norms and values of the society into which 
they are socialized. Instead of leveraging incentives or power, actors create common ground 
and coincident interpretations by promoting overriding values that all accept (Levy and Egan 
2003), heightening actor awareness of their mutual interdependence and paving the way for a 
collaborative strategy of engagement. 
 
Mobilizing Bandwagons 
This refers to actors enrolling large numbers of other participants to generate diffusion 
processes in favor of the collective issue at stake (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993; Hardy 
and Phillips 1998). The momentum creates isomorphic pressures for a critical mass of 
adoption (cooperation) and allows for the emergence of new institutions. Indeed, collective 
action can only be successful when institutional entrepreneurs are able to enroll a large 
majority of actors through the process of ‘intéressement’ or alliance building by including 
like-minded actors (Callon 1991). 
 
Devising Appropriate Incentive Structures 
This consists of designing institutional arrangements that encourage cooperation by 
reducing transaction costs – a common argument in institutional economics (North 1990). 
Wider support may also be garnered by creating appropriate incentive structures and raising 
awareness of non-compliance costs (Barrett 2003). As neo-institutionalists acknowledge, such 
structures are typically conceived or stimulated by ‘calculating’ and ‘interest-seeking’ 
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institutional entrepreneurs (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006) who enforce cooperation through 
both material and non-material incentives (Knoke 1988).  
Regime theory adds insights about effective incentives such as the design of an 
appropriate game structure that enhances compliance and deters free-riding. The issue under 
contention can be made self-enforcing (Barrett 2003) or be turned from a ‘public good’, 
accessible to all, into a ‘club good’ with exclusive benefits for club members that commit 
themselves to the institutional arrangements (Neumayer 2001). Actors can also build and 
sustain cooperation by reducing the costs associated with negotiating, monitoring, and 
enforcing agreements (Keohane 1984). Forums can be created that provide information about 
the relative distribution of gain from compliance and which progressively build trust among 
participants.  
Another regime-theoretical instrument is issue linkage (Sebenius 1983), where different 
problems with positive interdependence are clustered to encourage and ensure cooperation 
(Levy et al. 1993; Milner 1992). Since regimes do not exist in a societal vacuum, the 
repercussions of agreement violation may extend beyond the focal issue (Axelrod 1984), as in 
the attempts by OPEC members to link oil discussions with political issues. Issue linkage 
widens the scope for mutually beneficial exchanges, thus opening up more possible solutions 
for ‘deadlocked problems’ and facilitating effective retaliation against defectors or cheaters. 
Furthermore, it creates leverage by gaining actors’ commitment on low-priority issues and 
then getting them to cooperate on high-priority issues (Susskind 1994). A related mechanism 
is side payments, such as offering technological assistance in exchange for non-proliferation 
agreements. Creating effective incentives can thus be a powerful driver of collective 
institutional entrepreneurship. 
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Applying Ethical Guidelines  
This means motivating actors to cooperate by invoking ethical factors such as sense of 
fairness, equity, and altruism. While institutional theory typically explains behavior as 
influenced by social norms, in many instances people act not because of normative conformity 
(Knoke and Wright-Isak 1982) but because they perceive the act to be the ‘right’ thing to do 
(Wendt 2001). Such moral legitimacy reflects a positive normative evaluation of activities 
based on existing value systems (Aldrich and Fiol 1994) and is ‘sociotropic’: “it rests not on 
judgments about whether a given activity benefits the evaluator”, but rather on judgments 
about whether the activity effectively promotes societal welfare (Suchman 1995: 579). 
Regime theory explains how perceptions of fairness, ethical probity, and a shared aversion for 
negative outcomes can create compliance (Fireman and Gamson 1979).  
 
Using Implementation Mechanisms 
This refers to employing specific instruments to implement joint agreements. While 
institutional theory acknowledges that collective change can only be sustained if effectively 
implemented (Greenwood et al. 2002), it does not offer specific insights into implementation 
mechanisms. Here regime theory offers a number of guidelines. Implementation capacity can 
be built through information transfer, research grants, technical assistance, training, and 
management expertise to resource-constrained actors. Furthermore, periodic and timely 
assessments of the progress through review mechanisms (Young and Demko 1997) and non-
compliance procedures (Wettestad 1999) ensure continued cooperation. 
 
 All the above drivers can be leveraged in acts of collective institutional 
entrepreneurship to engender and sustain cooperation in collective action domains. For 
analytical reasons, we separated the various forces at play into six main drivers, but 
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understandably it is their confluence that brings about collective change through 
collaboration. Next, we apply our framework to global climate policy, in particular the entry-
into-force of the Kyoto Protocol, a recent but very influential global institution that addresses 
a major collective-action problem. The emergence of this new global regulatory institution 
was not triggered by any external shock or sudden power shifts; rather, near-unanimous 
adoption was achieved through collaborative breakthroughs. We therefore use this global 
institution to illustrate the drivers in our framework.  
 
ILLUSTRATION: THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL CLIMATE POLICY  
We selected global climate policy to illustrate our framework since it has evolved over 
two decades from a ‘non-issue’ to a major institutional field which faces the collective action 
dilemma. Our analytical focus was the nation state, underrepresented in the organizational 
literature in comparison with the corporation (Levy and Egan 2003; Kolk and Pinkse 2005). 
The process leading to the conclusion of the Kyoto Protocol has been extensively described in 
the literature. In particular, we drew on Bartsch et al. (2000), Grubb et al. (1999), and 
Oberthür and Ott (1999), who provide excellent historical overviews, as well as a range of 
other secondary sources, complemented by in-depth interviews with 30 experts in Europe and 
North America who had been involved in different roles (as negotiators, lobbyists, and 
observers) at different stages of the evolution of global climate policy and who represented 
the spectrum of different perspectives (national and supranational authorities, non-
governmental organizations, business associations, and scientists). The interview transcripts 
and notes, totaling 230 pages, were analyzed with the qualitative software package Atlas/ti to 
systematically construct a coherent narrative. 
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The Climate Change Problem 
A number of gases in the earth’s atmosphere, especially carbon dioxide, capture solar 
radiation that bounces from the earth. This heat retention or greenhouse effect causes a 
gradual warming of the earth’s atmosphere. It has both natural and human-induced causes. A 
large part of the human impact stems from the combustion of fossil fuels, which releases 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) that can lead to both progressive warming and increased occurrence 
of extreme weather events (Oberthür and Ott 1999). Probable consequences include the 
flooding or desertification of large areas, the disappearance of lowly situated islands, the 
melting of ice caps, the disappearance of many living species, and reduced economic growth 
(Stern 2006). The ensuing damage can be enormous. The material damage from extreme 
weather events has risen tenfold over the last four decades, and is expected to continue 
mounting due to cumulative, time-lagged effects (Holdren 2003; IPCC 2001).  
Mitigating the greenhouse effect is a collective action dilemma as it would require major 
changes in the production and consumption patterns of many nations. Getting these nation 
states to cooperate, however, poses a significant challenge. Firstly, most of them depend 
heavily on fossil fuels, as suppliers or consumers. Secondly, climate–change mitigation 
involves important externalities. While GHG emissions from all over the planet contribute to 
the global problem, parties taking corrective action enjoy only a small share of the benefits. 
Furthermore, important time lags separate the generations (not) taking action from those 
bearing the consequences of (in)action. Climate change is thus a major collective-action 
problem (Barrett 2003).  
  
The Institutionalization of Global Climate Policy  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), created in 1988, made the first 
major attempt to address climate change by increasing scientific knowledge of this complex 
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and controversial issue. Based on IPCC’s initial results, leaders of 188 countries accepted the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, 
which still constitutes the formal basis of all global climate policy (Oberthür and Ott 1999). It 
aims at the stabilization of atmospheric GHGs through the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities, encouraging developed countries to take the lead. The 
Convention operates through a Conference of the Parties (COP) to annually discuss progress 
and plans among nation states, a permanent Secretariat to deal with operational aspects, two 
Subsidiary Bodies to provide technical assistance, and a Global Environment Facility to 
financially support developing countries. 
After the IPCC’s 1995 report, indicating ‘a discernible human influence on global climate 
change’, and two preparatory COP meetings, the COP session in Kyoto in 1997 led to the 
unanimously accepted ‘Kyoto Protocol’ (Grubb et al. 1999). The Protocol stipulated that the 
overall GHG emissions of industrialized countries (‘Annex I Parties’) had to be reduced by 
5.2% over the period 2008-2012 (the ‘first commitment period’) in comparison with the base 
year 1990. The target concerns the net greenhouse impact: the emissions of a basket of six 
GHGs minus the absorption of these gases by ‘sinks’ (mainly forests). Developed nation 
states committed themselves to individualized targets, ranging from an 8% reduction to a 10% 
increase. No emission ceilings were formulated for developing countries. 
The Kyoto Protocol does not prescribe policies and measures (PAMs) but introduces a 
series of flexible implementation mechanisms (Bartsch et al. 2000; Grubb et al. 1999): 
emission trading (countries with unexploited emission room or ‘hot air’ selling this surplus to 
countries exceeding their emission ceilings), joint implementation (JI, making emission-
reducing investments in other industrialized countries), and the clean development mechanism 
(CDM, similar to JI but concerning investments in developing countries). The Protocol allows 
for excess emissions in a particular year to be compensated in subsequent years and for saving 
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unused assigned quantities for future periods (‘banking’). Non-complying parties must 
assume a 30% reduction surcharge in the next commitment period. The Kyoto Protocol has no 
significant means to penalize non-compliance. 
Subsequent COP sessions led to further elaboration of the Kyoto Protocol. The European 
Union (EU) implemented the Protocol through legislation, imposing emission ‘caps’ on large 
companies in targeted sectors and introducing an emission-trading system (Cass 2005). 
However, Kyoto’s entry-into-force was under threat because the United States (US), 
representing a third of all Annex-I emissions, had rejected the Protocol in 2001. To clear the 
‘double hurdle’ of getting on board at least 55% of all countries representing no less than 55% 
of all Annex-I emissions, it became imperative that Russia, a major emissions producer, also 
ratify the treaty. After protracted negotiations, Russia complied and the Protocol entered into 
force in 2005, implying that 156 countries representing 62% of all Annex-I emissions had 
ratified, or otherwise accepted, the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 2005). The US then signed an 
alternative, ‘complementary’ agreement with Australia (which had not ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol either), China, India, and South Korea to mitigate climate change through economic 
transactions in ‘clean’ energy technology. Since then, annual COP meetings have focused on 
new, increasing commitments for states after 2012, when the first commitment period ends. 
The European Commission launched, early in 2007, an initiative calling for a 20% reduction 
in EU emissions by 2020 (as compared with 8% by 2012). Formal global climate policy has 
thus become increasingly institutionalized (Depledge 2006; Hovi et al. 2003).  
 
Collective Institutional Entrepreneurship in Global Climate Policy 
In the theoretical framework, we identified six drivers that actors employ to spur and 
sustain collective change in an institutional field. Here, we discuss the relation of each 
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endogenous driver to collective institutional entrepreneurship in the field of global climate 
policy. 
 
Manipulating Power Configuration 
At the outset, some 200 sovereign nation states became involved in the global climate 
policy process. The large number of actors and the diversity of their views and motives 
engendered enormous complexity. Furthermore, the representatives of national climate-policy 
delegations, especially those of Europe and North America, often faced conflicting domestic 
interests. The US and OPEC countries were sympathetic with the conservative business lobby 
and supported their opposition to measures that would restrict their economic activities (Levy 
and Egan 2003). In contrast, EU member states and developing countries sided with 
environmental NGOs, who argued that GHG-intensive activities of ‘heavy emitters’ had to be 
stringently regulated (Oberthür and Ott 1999). 
After protracted negotiation (see below), three major blocks emerged: the EU, then 
consisting of 15 member states; the G77, representing over 100 developing countries; and the 
JUSSCANNZ coalition, made up of Japan, the US, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway, 
and New Zealand (Grubb et al. 1999). According to a Kyoto negotiator, “One was 
[negotiating] not as an individual party, but as part of a block.” A UN official added: “[T]he 
three major economic powers [the US, Japan, and the EU] were the main guiding forces. 
Obviously, the group of developing countries was also important.” Three major clusters 
emerged among almost 200 individual actors that concentrated power in the hands of a few. 
Several interviewees stressed that as nation states sought to manipulate power configuration 
by allying with other states to increase their bargaining power, the number of actors (and 
consequently the diversity of opinions) was dramatically reduced. This greatly facilitated the 
realization of consensus among diverse actors during the final Kyoto negotiations. 
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 Creating Common Ground 
Another important driver for building consensus was to create a shared vision. The large 
group of international experts in the IPCC contributed to creating a shared and ‘objective’ 
understanding of climate change through increased scientific knowledge about the 
phenomenon. ‘Hard’ scientific evidence helped overcome political bickering and human-
induced climate change came to be widely accepted as a ‘fact’ (Oberthür and Ott 1999). As 
argued by an NGO observer, “Because the science became so much stronger, there was a 
scientific consensus that was endorsed by the majority of the governments of the planet.” 
(Subsequent to the entry-into-force of the Kyoto Protocol, consensus among public 
policymakers appears to have been further increased by an authoritative economic report 
(Stern 2006), a political documentary with former US Vice-President Al Gore (Guggenheim 
2006), and ‘stronger’ scientific evidence (IPCC 2007) on the causes and consequences of 
climate change.) 
Despite widely divergent viewpoints, the negotiations led to the emergence of influential 
coalitions (Grubb et al. 1999; Oberthür and Ott 1999). Realizing that they were individually 
too weak to significantly influence the outcome, nation states allied with like-minded parties. 
EU member states shared high concern about climate issues, while southern European states 
did not want to compromise their economic growth. After intense internal negotiations, 
facilitated by scientific calculations of ‘reasonable’ individual targets, the EU finally came to 
a ‘Bubble’ agreement with one overall but internally differentiated target, ranging from -28% 
to +27% (Grubb et al. 1999). This agreement enabled the EU to speak with one voice and 
support stringent PAMs. According to a Kyoto observer, “If the EU had not come with a 
good, coherent story about how to address the burden sharing, other parties would have 
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completely divided it. The calculations established a basis for political coordination within the 
EU.”  
The G77 countries faced a different challenge. The stakes of the small-island states, who 
were threatened by disappearance, sharply contrasted with those of OPEC countries, whose 
principal sources of income were under threat. The G77 members tended to abstain from any 
commitments, arguing that it was the industrialized states that needed to ‘clean up the mess’ 
they had themselves created. The G77 had created a structure with a revolving chairmanship 
to protect the common interests of all members and well-prepared negotiators from large 
countries such as China and Brazil vigorously defended its position.  
The JUSSCANNZ coalition consisted of industrialized countries that wished to avoid 
stringent PAMS for different reasons. Japan was already an energy-efficient economy. The 
US expressed concern about constraining its economic growth. Sweden had just switched 
from nuclear to conventional power sources. Canada had considerable stakes in the production 
of fossil fuels. And Norway, Switzerland, and New Zealand had already switched to the 
higher use of natural energy sources. The unusual JUSSCANNZ coalition, dominated by the 
US and Japan, thus tried to block constraining regulation. Many interviewees stressed that 
when the enormous diversity of views and interests was reduced to three major negotiation 
blocks, the largest common denominator was obtained: the Kyoto Protocol specified binding 
targets (for reducing emissions) for industrialized countries, but with high flexibility as to 
their achievement. 
Several individuals and delegations facilitated consensus-building by employing their 
social skills (Gupta 2001). Environmental-Ministry officials of the Netherlands, chairing the 
EU in the first half of 1997, succeeded in bridging divergent stances through intensive 
consultation with EU member states. People within NGOs and academia also made relentless 
efforts to ensure persistent media coverage and influence on negotiation delegations, 
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especially those from developing countries. During the negotiations in Kyoto, chairman Raúl 
Estrada-Oyuela’s skills and determination to bridge divergent positions, ignore objections, 
highlight commonalities, and hammer out an agreement were considered by several observers 
as indispensable to the Protocol’s conclusion. For example, a former G77 adviser argued: 
“Estrada was a terrific manager. He managed to not hear certain complaints, not to pay 
attention to them. He heard a consensus and so he said: ‘We’re going forward.’ I think he was 
brilliant.” Subsequently, several European politicians took significant initiatives. For instance, 
the Dutch Environment Minister Jan Pronk helped obtain consensus on critical issues during 
subsequent COP meetings, while the British Prime Minister Tony Blair made global climate 
policy a top priority of his G8 chairmanship. Different actors thus created common ground: 
scientists clarified the causes and consequences of climate change, national negotiators sought 
and found common objectives with other states, and the chairman in Kyoto united divergent 
parties.   
 
Mobilizing Bandwagons 
Peer pressure and media exposure also helped in the emergence of a consensus. The 
development of a global climate policy faced frequent deadlocks, even during the Kyoto 
meeting. While many countries threatened to withdraw from the process, none did. The media 
and NGOs continuously covered the negotiations (Oberthür and Ott 1999). Multiple 
interviewees argued that this deterred withdrawals as no country wanted to be seen as 
subverting the process in the glare of the world media. Therefore, when the EU campaigned 
for a unanimous agreement, all countries followed suit, including skeptics such as the US and 
Japan. A former Kyoto negotiator: “[T]here was this feeling that the whole world was 
watching and that the negotiations could consequently not fail.” The media and NGOs thus 
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mobilized collaborative bandwagons that enabled enrolling diverse states for a common 
cause.  
 
Devising Appropriate Incentive Structures 
The binding individual targets for industrialized countries over the period 2008-2012, 
together with the 30% emission surcharge for non-compliance, are more concrete incentives 
than most other multilateral agreements among nations. At the same time, the average 
emission reduction of 5.2% is at best modest and meant only for industrialized countries 
(Grubb et al. 1999). Interviewees argued that these countries could circumvent domestic 
action by complying abroad, buying off their commitments, and eschewing ambitious targets 
for the yet-undefined post-2012 period. 
In contrast, side payments and issue linkage were successful instruments. The developing 
countries disliked the idea that industrialized countries could simply comply abroad, rather 
than ‘clean up their own household’ (Oberthür and Ott 1999). This opposition subsided when 
industrialized countries agreed to pay for the (additional) costs of CDM investments and 
provide free technology transfers to developing countries. The Kyoto Protocol would also not 
have emerged without ratification from Russia, which held a pivotal position after the US 
withdrawal in order to meet the double 55% threshold. A major reason why Russia finally did 
ratify was the EU’s pledge to support Russia in becoming a member of the World Trade 
Organization. A newspaper article read, “During the [May 2004] Summit in Moscow, Russia 
and the EU reached an agreement on the Russian accession to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). While both parties formally deny a linkage between both negotiations, [Russia’s 
President, Mr.] Putin said that European concessions in the field of bilateral trade relations 
had stimulated ‘a positive attitude towards ratification of [the] Kyoto [Protocol]’.” In short, 
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national negotiators of the Kyoto Protocol and the EU successfully leveraged incentive 
instruments such as side payments and issue linkage to enroll a large number of actors. 
 
Applying Ethical Guidelines 
Developed nation states accepted individualized binding targets and the exemption of 
developing countries from targets based on the perceived fairness of the UNFCCC principle 
of common but differentiated responsibilities. Likewise, the internal EU agreement stipulated 
that each member state would assume a ‘fair share’ of the burden, based on objective 
calculations (Phylipsen et al. 1998). According to a Kyoto negotiator, “[W]ithin the EU, 
solidarity was a crucial factor. Despite important ignorance (about what constituted a fair 
target), one was prepared to embrace the so-called ‘Bubble’ to enable negotiations.”  
Several interviewees highlighted that most nation states also had a joint ethical interest: a 
common and shared aversion to the problem that climate change could bring. With 
incremental but mounting scientific evidence, most countries began to recognize the moral 
responsibility of protecting future generations from its adverse consequences. Ethical 
guidelines such as fairness and shared aversion thus drove national negotiators to commit 
their countries towards mitigating climate change and to encourage others to follow suit. 
 
Using Implementation Mechanisms 
The Kyoto Protocol assigned several implementation mechanisms to sustain cooperation. 
Apart from the GHG absorbing sinks, three innovative policy instruments were introduced to 
implement commitments: emission trading, JI, and CDM (Grubb et al. 1999). These flexible 
mechanisms made it considerably easier for many parties with binding commitments to meet 
their targets. As a UN official argued, “One of the strengths is that, for the first time, 
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international economic instruments are part of the treaty. Because of these [implementation] 
instruments, (…) the Kyoto Protocol has a bigger impact than other treaties in the past.”  
Apart from the compliance mechanisms, all ratifying nation states consented to annual 
assessments of their GHG emission levels, enabling the global community to track actual 
performances and compare them to the agreed targets. Since many (developing) countries did 
not have the technical and financial capacities to accurately assess their emission levels, 
know-how and funds were provided to make sure they could participate (Bartsch et al. 2000). 
The UNFCCC Secretariat and other bodies supported and coordinated this process. National 
negotiators thus conceived and successfully applied implementation mechanisms such as 
innovative policy instruments, performance assessment, and capacity building to obtain and 
maintain the commitment of states to a global climate policy.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
While institutional theory has taken huge strides towards addressing the agency-structure 
paradox, there are few studies of collective institutional change where numerous dispersed 
actors need to overcome collective action dilemmas. To understand institutional change in the 
presence of fragmented interests, we drew on critical insights from regime theory, a research 
tradition in international relations where scholars have long studied the existence of 
considerable international cooperation among autonomous states through intergovernmental 
arrangements in the absence of a supranational authority. While the regime approach is 
largely state-centric, international decisions are also made and implemented by non-state 
actors (Kahn and Zald 1990). Insights from organizational theory thus have significant 
potential to inform international relations and revitalize regime analysis. On the other hand, 
regime-theoretic insights, though not frequently employed (Louis and Gray 1992), are just as 
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relevant for organizational scholars, in particular to understand the notion of collective 
institutional entrepreneurship.  
After reviewing and synthesizing institutional and regime theories, we constructed a 
conceptual framework of six drivers of collective institutional entrepreneurship. One driver, 
mobilizing bandwagons, was derived directly from institutional theory (Abrahamson and 
Rosenkopf 1993). Others, despite having origins in institutional theory, contain important 
differences. For instance, while common ground creation is similar to leveraging, it is the 
consequence of the collective efforts of numerous actors, rather than the skills of one or a few 
key institutional entrepreneurs (Greenwood and Suddaby 2006; Lawrence and Suddaby 
2006). Consider the business world’s development of ‘private’ regimes for facilitating 
commercial operations (Rittberger 1995), such as the chemical industry’s Responsible Care 
program to address environmental issues (Hoffman 1999) that required ‘institutional work’ 
from a broad category of actors. Similarly, while both old institutionalism and neo-
institutionalism consider power and control of resources to be a central aspect of collaboration 
and change (Greenwood and Hinings 1996), there are few discussions about the regime-
theoretic argument of how power concentration enables cooperation. Finally, while 
institutional theorists recognize that behavior is influenced by social norms (Suchman 1995), 
there is far less emphasis on explaining actions that are driven by ethical motives such as 
altruism and a sense of fairness, rather than normative conformity (Wendt 2001). 
Even the drivers with origins in regime theory are certainly not alien to institutional 
theorists, but have not been highlighted or labeled as such in empirical descriptions of 
institutional entrepreneurship or change in the literature. For instance, the use of bargaining 
and deal-making can be considered incentive structures through which institutional 
entrepreneurs manipulate the support of stakeholders by conveying the political consequences 
of (not) supporting change in emerging fields (Maguire et al. 2004). Likewise, institutional 
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theorists acknowledge that effective implementation and maintenance of the institutional 
order through ‘policing’ – enforcement, auditing, and monitoring (Lawrence and Suddaby 
2006) – are essential for long-term institutional survival, even if the maintenance of 
organizational fields has received significantly less attention than their creation (Scott 2001). 
For instance, Guler et al.’s (2002) study of ISO 9000 quality certification for firms documents 
the importance of regular monitoring to maintain compliance with standard institutionalized 
practices, but does not specify mechanisms or guidelines to sustain an emerging order. 
Regime theory, on the other hand, provides several mechanisms to ensure compliance and to 
sanction underperforming actors (Wettestad 1999). 
By exploring the conceptual connections between institutional and regime theories, we 
have provided a multi-faceted framework for explaining collective institutional 
entrepreneurship. Firstly, we have enriched institutional theory with insights from regime 
theory, showing how collective institutional entrepreneurs can create agency among actors in 
the face of collective inaction. Secondly, we have developed an analytical framework that can 
be used in the ‘non-institutional’ literature addressing interorganizational collaboration. 
Thirdly, our explanation for collective institutional entrepreneurship and change is powerful 
since it views embedded actors as responding to both a ‘logic of consequentiality’ and a ‘logic 
of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen 1989). Indeed, sociological theories can gain from 
‘treading’ into the rational choice terrain (Zajac and Westphal 2004) and we engage 
institutionalists by demonstrating that such conceptions offer a more comprehensive 
explanation of agency in collective action domains. Finally, our analysis has important 
implications for practice, where agents often face the double paradox of institutionalization in 
collective action areas. 
Practitioners should be conscious of, and draw on, the panoply of drivers of collective 
institutional entrepreneurship that operate in confluence, both concurrently and sequentially. 
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Rather than deadlocking collective change efforts and fomenting ‘turf battles’ by targeting a 
subset of stakeholders with a few, predetermined change instruments, collective institutional 
entrepreneurs should explore the best possible (combination of) instruments to engage 
divergent institutional actors at different points in time. For example, entrepreneurs may first 
appeal to relatively like-minded actors through ethical inducements and common ground 
exploration to generate a critical mass, then mobilize reluctant actors through appropriate 
incentives, timely information dissemination, empathy with divergent viewpoints, devising 
arrangements which others perceive as fair, and ‘shaming’ the defectors into fulfilling 
responsibilities, and finally build capacity and regularly perform assessments to sustain and 
implement change. Since agency is dispersed, it is critical for collective institutional 
entrepreneurs to engage credible others who fulfill complementary roles in the institutional 
work required for undertaking and maintaining collective action. 
While much theorizing remains to be done in this emerging view of collective 
institutional entrepreneurship, we believe our study is an important step forward. The relative 
importance of various drivers in our framework and their interactions should be tested on a 
range of collective action issues. At the discursive level, a study of the language actors adopt 
to bring others into the fold would reveal important dynamics of collective institutional 
entrepreneurship. Scholars should also focus on failed efforts to collaborate and change, as 
many conflicts remain unresolved and intractable. Finally, a more fine-grained analysis of 
differences in individual attributes of participants such as identities, cultural backgrounds, and 
collaborative experience would be important because actors may differ in their propensity to 
cooperate (Weber et al. 2004), resulting in different ‘thresholds’ for joining a collective cause 
(Granovetter 1978). It is indeed the micro-level interplay of interests, power, and cognition 
that trickles up to agency at the collective level. Such a micro-level analysis may also reveal 
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covert purposes of collaboration and the extent to which cooperation may be cooptation or 
extended for ceremonial reasons.  
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